This July 2021 newsletter – received from CBC News requesting access to information – also states that as CSIS pursues the threat of ideologically motivated extremism (IMVE) in Canada, it faces many of the same challenges faced by his US counterparts before the riot. The July 2021 newsletter includes summaries compiled by CSIS officials of the U.S. Senate report on the Capitol attack on January 6, 2021, and the U.S. National Strategy for Combating Domestic Terrorism. The report also includes CSIS comments on the incident, which were to be communicated to senior officials of the public security, defense, immigration and justice services. Reacting to reports from the FBI and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to U.S. lawmakers, CSIS said there were “inconsistencies between and within the intelligence products that led to a lack of consensus on the seriousness of the Jan. 6 threat.” . CSIS briefings highlighted problems faced by the FBI and DHS in their efforts to prepare for an attack on the Capitol by a mob of supporters of outgoing President Donald Trump. CSIS said these problems included distinguishing between the intent of potential threat agents, distinguishing protected freedom of speech from credible threats of violence, gaining legal access to private or closed social media platforms, and gaining access to encrypted cryptocurrencies. by IMVE individuals threatening violence. “CSIS faces many of the same research challenges as its US counterparts in this area,” the paper said. “These considerations reinforce the importance of CSIS’s efforts to modernize and maximize its principles as part of the efforts of Canada and its allies to address violent extremism.” A truck driver is sprayed with pepper while police impose precautionary measures against protesters near Parliament Hill on February 19, 2022. (Evan Mitsui / CBC)
CSIS defines IMVE as extremism driven by “a series of grievances and ideas from across the traditional ideological spectrum.” “The resulting worldview consists of a personalized narrative that focuses on an extremist’s willingness to incite, allow and / or mobilize violence,” the CSIS website states. Challenges in the newsletter make a national security expert question how seriously the intelligence community and law enforcement took the Freedom Convoy event before anti-vaccine protesters occupied central Ottawa for weeks in February. “Where the US seems to have fallen is the contradictory and inconsistent advice,” said Stephanie Carvin, a former national security analyst with the federal government who now teaches at Carleton University. “I do not know about CSIS, but it was a community problem we had here in Canada that some services recognized and some did not, and it was [the Ottawa Police Service] get consistent advice? That would be something I would be interested in learning. “

Gaps in information exchange

What the spy agency saw and passed on to the police, and how the police responded to this information, is likely to be scrutinized through the recently announced public inquiry and the Special Joint Committee examining the federal government’s decision to invoke the Emergency Law. for liquidation the occupation of the convoy. The 2021 fact sheet points out a point of view that the investigation and the commission may want to address: the continuing gaps in the exchange of information between CSIS and the police. “CSIS continues to challenge the challenges of exchanging classified information to inform law enforcement, while protecting it from harmful disclosure,” the statement said. Carvin said the real question may be whether the authorities failed to turn CSIS warnings and advice into action. “It’s quite clear that our intelligence services seemed to understand what was going on. That’s the big difference I think between [the] “and January 6,” he said. “It seems that the service was informed in the city center before this happened, so why did not this intelligence turn into better preparation and advice?” CSIS Director David Vigneault holds a press conference at Parliament Hill in Ottawa on Thursday, July 16, 2020. (Sean Kilpatrick / The Canadian Press)
A CSIS spokesman said they could not confirm or deny the specifics of his research, business interests, methodologies or activities. “With these words, I would like to emphasize that the definition of threats, as described in the CSIS Act, specifically excludes legal protest and dissent,” said Brandon Champagne. “CSIS works closely with its partners on security and intelligence issues, including the exchange of necessary information with law enforcement authorities to ensure public safety.” In the newsletter, CSIS states that in order to better monitor IMVE, it is seeking an update of Canadian Security Intelligence Act. “In order to fulfill our mandate to investigate IMVE, advise the government and take mitigation measures, CSIS must have the tools to identify and disrupt threat agents in this data-rich and a rapidly threatening environment, while meeting Canada’s expectations of privacy. “the document states. Chris Parsons, a senior fellow at the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, said it was almost impossible to determine whether CSIS had sufficient powers now or how it was developing. “I do not think CSIS is transparent enough to know the answer to that,” he said. “But I think there should be a mentality about when we give these powers to national security, and law enforcement officials should also be asked to provide some kind of annual report on how they use them. and their effectiveness. of their use “. He also said he wondered why CSIS did not express concerns about investigating violent extremism with ideological motives when the government passed updated national security legislation in 2019. “This is a bit shocking, as it suggests that CSIS did not understand what they wanted, or eventually decided they wanted to take the first bite of the apple and then take another bite,” he said. Earlier this week, CSIS Director David Vigneault told a committee of lawmakers and senators that his resources would be further investigated by IMVE. “We are constantly looking at the movement of violent extremists with ideological motives, so we have a pretty good understanding of the dynamics at play,” he said.

Sharing information with banks

CSIS officials who wrote the briefing also said that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service section of Canada, which prevents it from sharing classified threat information with non-governmental partners, undermines its work. “… Section 19 of the CSIS Act prevents CSIS from sharing classified threat information with non-governmental partners, including financial institutions, which poses challenges to how the Office can support efforts to limit its funding. terrorism “, the information note states. Parsons said there was a risk that CSIS would classify inappropriate individuals as terrorists or claim to be involved in activities contrary to Canadian interests and then pass that information on to banks and other institutions. “This may be one thing if you are going to chase people who will drive into the prime minister’s house and try to shoot him. But there are many other CSIS groups that have probably not deserved it or certainly do not believe it.” he said. In addition to its legislation, there are a number of policy changes that could change the way CSIS responds to IMVE. Police in riot gear storm a rally in central Ottawa on February 19, 2022. (Evan Mitsui / CBC)
In the briefing, CSIS states that it is also monitoring the ongoing CLOUD Act negotiations between Ottawa and the United States. U.S. law allows law enforcement agencies to require U.S.-based technology companies (by warrant or summons) to generate requested data stored on their servers, regardless of whether the data is stored in the U.S. or overseas . If Canada were to connect, CSIS could theoretically gain faster access to data held by Google, Apple, Facebook and other major online players. ATTENTION: How the escort protest paralyzed Ottawa

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The agency also said it was closely monitoring the government’s efforts to pass internet harassment legislation that could require regulated online entities such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and TikTok to flag content that raises national concerns. security in CSIS. “CSIS will continue to work with Government of Canada partners on government policy initiatives and will seize every opportunity to strengthen the toolkit to respond to this dynamic threat,” the statement said. Carvin said Canada, like some of its allies, should regularly update powers and powers given to security services such as CSIS in order to comply with both emerging technologies and privacy issues. “How do we want our security services to be active on the Internet? Because I think if you ask most Canadians, ‘You just want CSIS to surf the Internet randomly looking for bad stuff,’ the answer is no, and I think that’s probably the right answer.” ” he said. “But Parliament must act.”